I’m interested to read that Stuart Derbyshire has changed his opinion on foetal pain. This is important because Stuart, who is associate professor of psychology at the National University of Singapore, has been and is a prominent researcher and commentator on foetal pain. His view was that foetuses and early stage infants can’t experience pain. Now he believes that foetuses may be able to feel pain as early as 12 weeks after gestation.
Of course, Stuart’s u-turn is interesting because it could have moral and practical impact, but it’s also interesting because it demonstrates the crucial role that theoretical models play in the interpretation of scientific evidence. In short, his argument that foetuses can’t feel pain went like this:
- The evidence is that the cortex, which is part of the brain, is not mature until some weeks after birth.
- A mature cortex is needed for anyone to be conscious of sensations like pain.
- Therefore, foetuses and early stage infants can’t feel pain.
The focus of Stuart’s u-turn is (2), which needs a little explanation. It’s natural to say “I’m feeling pain”, or “There’s a pain in my leg”. Sentences or thoughts like this suggest a distinction between the I (the self) and the pain; I am experiencing this pain. This distinction is the basis of ‘higher-order theories of consciousness‘ (there are plenty of variations). The idea is that there’s no experience without someone (an I) to have the experience. As pains are experiences, there’s no pain unless the nervous system is sufficiently developed to support I (the self). In effect, a higher-order theory makes I part of (i.e. a constituent of) the experience. Stuart’s conclusion (3) that foetuses and early stage infants can’t feel pain was grounded in the evidence that the cortex isn’t mature enough to support I until a few weeks after birth (1), and his acceptance of a higher-order theory of pain (and other experiences)(2).
Stuart still believes that the cortex isn’t sufficiently developed to support I until the early stage infant is a few weeks old, but he now rejects the higher-order theory that I is a constituent of experiences like pain (2). (His rejection isn’t surprising, because a higher-order theory of experience is problematic for many reasons. Here’s a couple of reasons: it strongly suggests that most animal species are not conscious, which is implausible; and it’s difficult to explain how a higher-order mental state could develop before primitive states like pains, visual experiences, etc..) Instead, he distinguishes between the recognition that we’re having an experience (this is a higher-order mental state directed at a primitive mental state) and the experience itself (the primitive mental state – in this case, the pain). And, in his opinion, the foetal nervous system may be sufficiently developed to support experiences (including pain) as early as 12 weeks after gestation.
Although this is conceptually challenging stuff, in essence it illustrates why theories and concepts are so important. Stuart’s view on foetal and neonatal pain has changed because his overarching theory of experiential consciousness has changed; not because there’s new evidence of earlier maturation of the cortex.
If you want to read more, papers reflecting Stuart Derbyshire’s former and current views on foetal pain can be found here:
You can also find on-line explanations of higher-order theories of consciousness in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. The explanation in the ‘Consciousness’ entry here is more straightforward than the ‘Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness’ entry here but both are difficult for the uninitiated. I don’t think the Wikipedia entry is at all helpful because it uses technical terms without any explanation.
The Pain Jam 